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Moral pluralism is the norm in contemporary society. Even the best philosophical arguments rarely persuade moral
opponents who differ at a foundational level. This has been vividly illustrated in contemporary debates in bioethics
surrounding contentious issues such as abortion and euthanasia. It is readily apparent that bioethics discourse lacks
an empirical explanation for the broad differences about various topics in bioethics and health policy. In recent
years, social and cognitive psychology has generated novel approaches for defining basic differences in moral
intuitions generally. We propose that if empirical research using social intuitionist theory explains why people
disagree with one another over moral issues, then the results of such research might help people debate their
moral differences in a more constructive and civil manner. We illustrate the utility of social intuitionism with data
from a national physician survey.Introduction
Despite decades of debate, humans remain polarized on
morally controversial issues and often find ourselves
entrenched in unconstructive disagreement. The best philo-
sophical arguments appear powerless to persuade when
seemingly rational interlocutors differ on very basic beliefs
about human life and its meaning. This reality has played
out in contemporary debates, including the longstanding
debate over abortion. Currently, bioethics discourse lacks
an empirical explanation for why deep disagreements per-
sist on a broad range of topics in bioethics and health pol-
icy. In recent years, social and cognitive psychologists have
generated novel approaches for defining basic differences in
moral intuitions.
In this essay, we wish to describe some recent insights
on social intuitionism drawing primarily from the work
of Jonathan Haidt and examine the utility of these find-
ings in the ethics of medicine. This essay is divided into
four parts: the first examines what we can learn from so-
cial psychology about morality; the second part analyzes
why seemingly rational, well-meaning individuals so* Correspondence: tilburt.jon@mayo.edu
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unless otherwise stated.frequently disagree given that we share common evolved
moral foundations; the third suggests that moral psych-
ology can help create a more constructive discourse on
contentious topics in bioethics, which we will demon-
strate using data from a recent national survey we con-
ducted among practicing US physicians; and the final
part uses President Obama’s May 2009 commencement
address at the University of Notre Dame [1] to illustrate
the way social intuitionism might explain the strengths
and weakness of public argument.
As disagreement over abortion and other bioethics
and health policy debates persist it may behoove all op-
posing sides to listen more carefully, characterize their
opponents fairly, and appreciate the moral reasons that
resonate with the intuitions of friends and strangers
alike. Bridging those disagreements on the most conten-
tious topics in bioethics will remain challenging, but we
contend that attempting to understand disagreements
using a tool from moral psychology may provide the
framework needed to achieve the ideal of “fair minded”
debate the President articulated at Notre Dame.
Moral psychology
In today’s morally pluralistic society, there is no universal
agreement on many fundamental moral issues. Even arriving
at a common language to describe our differences seems
elusive, not to mention arriving at a universal theory of mor-
ality [2,3]. Throughout history, philosophers have offeredtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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for resolving moral disagreements. Social intuitionism has
taken a different approach and asked, could it be that we are
wired to reason from normative conclusions rather than to
them? Here is where moral psychology offers some appeal-
ing explanations that most dominant philosophical ap-
proaches to morality (especially in contemporary bioethics)
have not been able to provide.
According to social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, moral
systems are “sets of interlocking values, practices, intu-
ition, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work to-
gether to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social
life possible [4].” Two competing accounts of morality’s
origin and function stand out – binding or individualizing
moralities [5].
Those who hold an individualizing view of morality
see society as a collection of equal individuals. In this ac-
count, the purpose of morality is to protect individuals
from harming one another, preserving individual liberty,
or achieving net individual benefit through collective
means. Those who hold an individualizing view of mor-
ality often stress ethical theory such as that found in the
philosophies of the Enlightenment (e.g. Kant, Mill,
Locke, etc.). In contrast, binding moralities stress the
role of communities and groups as the primary locus of
moral concern. Binding moralities build their identity by
“reshaping” individuals to “suppress or regulate selfish-
ness and make social life possible [5]”. Thus, proponents
of binding morality stress character or virtue ethics ap-
proaches to achieving a shared vision of communal life.
As appealing as these individualizing and binding con-
structs are, both contain elements that resonate with
existing moral theory and our deep sense (even among
moral strangers) of what matters in the moral life. Re-
cent research in moral psychology has demonstrated
that moral reasoning can drive morality, however this
usually occurs when reasoning triggers particular moral
intuitions [6].
This study was approved by the Mayo Clinic Institutional
Review Board can be added to the methods section.
Moral reasoning or character formation
As previously alluded to, ethical theory has been greatly
influenced by Enlightenment rationalism in the individu-
alizing strain especially since Kant (1724–1804). For
Kant, reason was the groundwork of morality guided by
a priori maxims that were accessible to all rational indi-
viduals [7]. The motivation for morality was a rational
duty to the moral law and not consequences or utility.
Therefore, if a child refrained from lying out of fear of
punishment or loyalty to an authority figure, she would
not have been making a moral choice. Only if the child
rationally chose to tell the truth, would she have made a
moral choice. While philosophers have held a broadrange of positions on the role of reason in the moral life,
“individualizing” and “reason” based approaches to mor-
ality and ethics have certainly dominated moral dis-
course for the last 200 years.
That same dominance in ethical theory was also
adapted by modern psychologists in theories of moral
development. To a large extent, 20th century psycholo-
gists Piaget and Kohlberg followed Kant’s lead by devel-
oping theories that reflect the individualizing and
reason-based approaches. Moral development for them
was primarily a cognitive process of refining one’s moral
reasoning. The highest stage of development, according
to Kohlberg, is when an individual reasons purely from
the principles behind societal laws, without regard for
cultural norms [8]. For Kohlberg, the principles behind
social laws included fairness, equality, and justice. In this
respect Piaget and Kohlberg represent the psychology
kin of Kant. In their view, morality is really about refin-
ing our reasoning with the ultimate goal of protecting
individuals.
But morality resists such tidy categories. Critics of a
strictly rationalist approach to moral reasoning protest
from virtue, feminist, and other schools of thought. For
instance, Carol Gilligan argues that other forces are at
work in our moral sensibilities besides fairness, equality,
and justice. Notions of care, protection, and nurture are
equally powerful influences on our moral judgments [9].
As we will go on to describe, more recent psychology re-
search calls into question the idea that reasoning is the
primary source of morality, and seems to confirm empir-
ically a more emotive, visceral source for morality rooted
in binding moralities of groups.
In contrast to individualizing approaches, the binding
approach to morality emphasizes character formation.
Under the binding conception, communities shape char-
acter through practice and habituation all toward a com-
mon set of goals. This can be seen both in the ethics of
Aristotle and the broader virtue traditions as well as
modern manifestations in the sociology of Durkheim.
Intuitions
Moral judgments are a cognitive process. However, so-
cial intuitionism has attempted to remove what it sees as
a false dichotomy between emotion and reasoning.
While historically there has been a prioritization of rea-
son over and above emotions and passions, social intu-
itionism cautions the reverence of rationalism. Haidt
emphasizes that emotion and reason are really just two
types of cognition [10]. Furthermore, his empirical work
suggests that emotions are actively at work when we
make moral judgments. These judgments are usually
automatic gut-reactions. They occur “fast, automatic
[ally], and [are] not available to introspection [5]”. These
‘moral intuitions’, a type of moral emotion, come first
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of the intuitive belief. Haidt has described moral reasons
as “the tail wagged by the intuitive dog [10]”. Further-
more, research has demonstrated “that people generally
begin reasoning by setting out to confirm their initial hy-
pothesis. They rarely seek disconfirming evidence, and
are quite good at finding support for whatever they want
to believe [6].” This is in line with previous research on
motivated reasoning and confirmation bias. Haidt argues
that our post-hoc justifications of our intuitive judg-
ments often cause an illusion of objective reasoning.
Paul Bloom, a critique of an intuitionist explanation of
moral reasoning, argues that “emotional responses alone
cannot explain one of the most interesting aspects of
human nature: that morals change [11]”. Bloom argues
that deliberate persuasion, the use of reasoned argu-
ments, is responsible for the moral change that has oc-
curred regarding issues such as women’s rights or the
morality of slavery. Haidt too believes that reason and
arguments can and do produce change. However, he
writes that this rarely occurs through conscious delibera-
tive reasoning alone but rather, through reasoned social
interactions: “other people often influence us, in part by
presenting the counter evidence we rarely seek out our-
selves [6]”. Furthermore, for Haidt if you want to affect
social change, you must appeal to intuitions. Appealing
to reason is not effective if someone believes an action
violates his or her intuitions. This tension, between two
forms of cognition, intuition and reasoning, is real and
will continue to be debated and studied for many years
to come.
So where do these intuitions come from? How do chil-
dren develop the morality that is particular to their culture?
In one sense, as an empirical question, one can only conjec-
ture. According to Haidt, “morality requires guidance and
examples from the local culture to externalize and config-
ure itself properly, and children actively seek out role
models to guide their development [12]”. Community is es-
sential to assist in the externalization of morality. As the
child develops, she begins to develop virtues – a set of cap-
acities, habits and dispositions to help navigate the intricate
social world. Haidt defines virtues as “finely tuned auto-
matic reactions to complex social situations, a kind of ex-
pertise [12]”. Although a detailed examination of this falls
outside the scope of this manuscript, the hypothesis is that
different virtues of a particular community come from
moral foundations that have evolved over time.
Moral foundations
Haidt, drawing on the previous work of Fiske [13] and
Shweder [14], has identified at least five dimensionsa of
these intuitions which he describes as “moral foundations”:
whether or not someone was harmed [care/harm], whether
or not someone acted unfairly [fairness/cheating], whetheror not someone betrayed his or her group [loyalty/betrayal],
whether or not the people involved were of the same rank
[authority/subversion], and whether or not someone did
something disgusting [sanctity/degradation] [15]. According
to Haidt, communities and societies derive their norms and
virtues from these moral foundations. For example, the
virtue of honesty originates in the fairness foundation; the
virtue of self-sacrifice in the foundation of loyalty. If his ac-
count is correct, we can begin to see how differences in
morality may be so viscerally felt and deeply entrenched.
Why does moral disagreement exist?
According to social intuitionists, the ideological divides
common in bioethics do not primarily arise from differ-
ences in moral reasoning but rather from differences in
moral foundations (or intuitions) which arose in differ-
ent cultures to build social collaboration. Through his
empirical work, Haidt has found that moral disagree-
ment is often a battle over the relative weight that oppo-
nents place on each of the foundations [16,17]. Thus, we
differ in how our community has constructed a morality
upon basic foundations. This theoretical construct has
been extensively tested and proves to be a powerful tool
to explain differences in moral judgments among the
general population [6].
For example, Haidt has studied the “cultural wars” be-
tween liberals and conservatives. Haidt’s research demon-
strates that political liberals rate considerations of care/
harm and fairness/cheating much higher than loyalty/be-
trayal, authority/subversion, or sanctity/degradation, while
political conservatives give equal consideration to all five
foundations [6]. The foundation of fairness in essence
represents half of moral consideration for liberals, yet it
represents roughly one-fifth of moral consideration for
conservatives. These differences may explain conten-
tious disagreements between political liberals and polit-
ical conservatives.
In a recent study of over 10,000 US adults, Koleva et al.
sought to examine how moral foundations could explain
the current culture war on thirteen social issues including
abortion, euthanasia, and stem cell research [18]. They re-
port that the sanctity/degradation foundation best pre-
dicted disapproval toward these culture war issues.
Moral psychology and bioethics
How can moral psychology inform debates in bioethics? To
begin, it may be instructive to revisit some of the cherished
assumptions we hold about the role of reason in bioethics
discourse. There is disagreement in the field regarding both
methodology and foundations. Yet, we suspect that the pre-
vailing frameworks for bioethics used in this journal and
other professional bioethics arenas take as given a reason-
based approach to morality. This may differ from the type
of everyday moral reasoning about bioethics that, for
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might engage in. Perhaps acknowledging that binding, nar-
rative moralities are significantly relevant to how many
people actually make moral decisions would be a useful
corrective to contemporary bioethics discourse if bioethi-
cists are to be persuasive. While we acknowledge that em-
pirical research alone cannot function as a normative
justification for intuitionism, descriptive ethics can be used
to test normative theory [19] and to “enrich the store of
normative understandings [20]” utilized in moral argumen-
tation. Applying insights from social intuitionism could
prompt our field to reexamine individualizing versions of
bioethics discourse, which fail to resonate with large seg-
ments of the public.
Take, for example, the dominant theory behind mod-
ern bioethics that of prima facie principles developed by
Ross [21] and its adaption to bioethics by Beauchamp
and Childress [22]. This accessible and detailed frame-
work became the dominant vocabulary for cultivating
physician ethics and professionalism training in the last
30 years. Beauchamp and Childress chose four principles
appropriate for biomedical ethics that they believe merit
wide acceptance irrespective of foundational differences:
beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice. Yet,
principlism underwent serious scrutiny by many scholars
for lacking rational justification and a firmer grounding
to a larger moral tradition [23].
Could the principles reflect an “intuitions bias” of a
two-foundation individualizing morality? It is interesting
to note that the four principles proposed by Beauchamp
and Childress correspond to just two of the five moral
foundations described by Haidt. The principles of ben-
eficence and nonmaleficence essentially represent the
moral foundation of care/harm, with the principle of
justice corresponding to the foundation of fairness/
cheating. The principle of autonomy is in tension with
the foundations of loyalty/betrayal and authority/sub-
version. One might reasonably argue that principlism
largely disregards three of the moral foundations – loy-
alty, authority, and sanctity. On the one hand, this fact
may explain why principlism seems to hold such univer-
sal appeal – care/harm and fairness/cheating resonate
with almost everyone, being utilized in moral decision
making by liberals, moderates, and conservatives alike.
However, the apparent two-foundation origin of princip-
lism might offer another account of why reasoning with
principles alone are insufficient to solve vexing moral
disagreements.
Some of the most heated and entrenched moral disagree-
ment in bioethics frequently seem to hinge on the legitim-
acy or relevance of the “other” three foundations, especially
the foundation of sanctity/degradation, as discussed above.
The disagreements over issues such as abortion are, accord-
ing to Haidt, “based in a real truth, a real difference on aquestion of sacredness of life [24]”. In contrast, a great deal
of the debate regarding the ethics of abortion has focused
on the biological and medical question of when a human
life begins, a concern largely oblique to the basic moral in-
tuitions in question. On questions regarding the beginning
of life, Peter Singer puts it quite frankly: “the crucial moral
question is not when human life begins, but when human
life reaches the point at which it merits protection [25]”.
For Singer, the justifiability of abortion, after life has indeed
begun, depends on one’s belief regarding, “What, in the
end, is so special about the fact that a life is human? [26]”.
Put in psychology-speak: one’s identification with the sanc-
tity/degradation construct will shape how one approaches
and ultimately answers Singer’s question. We find Singer
helpful in naming the fundamental difference in moral in-
tuitions about the sanctity of human life at the heart of
many such debates.
Describing moral differences in physicians
In order to better learn why physicians differ in their under-
standing of questions of purity and sanctity of human life,
as well as in the other constructs of social intuitionism, we
surveyed a random sample of 2000 practicing U.S. physi-
cians from all specialties. Does social intuitionism really
makes a difference in physician opinions on issues such as
abortion or euthanasia? The details of the survey’s develop-
ment and implementation have been published elsewhere
[27]. The survey included Haidt’s Moral Foundations Ques-
tionnaire (MFQ30) along with questions pertaining to mor-
ally controversial healthcare topics. Physicians’ mean scores
for the five moral foundations (care, fairness, loyalty, au-
thority, and sanctity) were calculated based on their re-
sponses to six survey items for each foundation. The
MFQ30 contains two parts, the first of which measures the
degree of agreement or disagreement with various state-
ments. Each of these items were scored on a scale ranging
from 1 to 6, with 1 being “strongly disagree”, 2 being “mod-
erately disagree”, 3 being “slightly disagree”, 4 being “slightly
agree”, 5 being “moderately agree”, and 6 being “strongly
agree”. The second part of the MFQ30 examined the rele-
vance of various features to determining whether or not
something is right or wrong. These items were scored on a
scale ranging from 1 to 6, with 1 being “not at all relevant”,
3 being “somewhat relevant”, and 6 being “extremely rele-
vant” to determining whether or not something is right or
wrong. In addition, as one of many measures, we asked
physicians to indicate the degree to which they objected (if
at all) to abortion because the fetus has a chromosomal
defect.
A total of 1032 of 1895 (54%) physicians completed the
survey. Of the 1032 respondents, 561 (56%) had no moral
objection, 231 (23%) had a moderate objection, and 208
(21%) had a strong moral objection to abortion. As physi-
cians’ degree of objection to abortion increased, so too did
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viduals who strongly objected to abortion had high scores
in all five foundations, especially sanctity/degradation
(mean =4.6, SD =0.9) (Figure 1). In contrast, those physi-
cians who had no moral objection to abortion gave high
ratings to questions about care/harm and fairness/cheating,
but lower ratings to the foundations of loyalty/betrayal, au-
thority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. The greatest
difference between those with no moral objection and those
who strongly objected to abortion was the foundation of
sanctity/degradation (mean difference =1.2).
We saw similar results when we asked physicians to
indicate the degree to which they objected to helping a
terminally ill patient hasten her own death (Figure 2). Of
the respondents, 331 (33%) had no moral objection, 339
(34%) had a moderate objection, and 330 (33%) had a
strong moral objection to euthanasia. Individuals who
strongly objected to euthanasia had high scores in
all five foundations, especially sanctity/degradation
(mean =4.3, SD =1.1). In contrast, those physicians who
had no moral objection to euthanasia gave high ratings
to questions about care/harm and fairness/cheating, but
rated loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanc-
tity/degradation very low. Like abortion, the greatest
difference between those with no moral objection and
those who strongly objected to euthanasia was the foun-
dation of sanctity/degradation (mean difference =1.2). If
our data are any indication, physicians also rely on their
intuitive beliefs when judging controversial topics in
bioethics. Social intuitionism can explain as well as in-
form the tone of public dialogue on such contentious is-
sues as we show below.
Toward a more constructive dialogue: Obama, abortion,
and Notre dame
In May 2009, President Obama faced a challenge of grand
proportions. How would he address graduating Notre




























Figure 1 Moral foundations of physicians who object to abortion verdiffered with the majority of the Roman Catholic Notre
Dame community? We find in his remarks several exem-
plary features of constructive dialogue in the face of dis-
agreement that strikes a hopeful tone and offers room for
incremental agreement. In that address the President
named this central challenge: “How does each of us remain
firm in our principles, and fight for what we consider right,
without, as Father John said, demonizing those with just as
strongly held convictions on the other side? [1]”.
First, Mr. Obama approached the topic with humility,
calling for all “to be wary of too much self-righteousness
[1]”. Second, the President highlighted and acknowl-
edged the real moral divide that exists: “the fact is that
at some level…the views of the two camps are irreconcil-
able [1]”. Third, the President focused on areas that the
two camps could agree on. He argued for reducing the
number of abortions, making adoption more easily avail-
able, and providing support and care for women who
choose not to abort. And contrary to the views of some
liberals, he proposed to draft a conscience clause for
medical providers who disagree with abortion. In es-
sence, he appealed to the intuitive concerns of those op-
posed to abortion on issues related to care/harm and
fairness/cheating.
Nevertheless, even the President could learn from the
insights offered by social intuitionism to strengthen the
richness of public discourse on a topic such as abortion.
The President might have further bridged the gap be-
tween the two “irreconcilable” camps if he had at least
recognized the other three foundations of morality uti-
lized by abortion opponents. For instance, he might have
said, ‘For many these are not just a matter of rights and
fairness, it is a matter of the heart – a matter of fidelity
to what one holds as sacred.’ In so doing, he would have
acknowledged the intuition divide between social liberals
and conservatives. Absent such an acknowledgment,
subsequent remarks risk portraying a kind of moral





















































Figure 2 Moral foundations of physicians who object to euthanasia versus those who have no moral objection.
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ledge the extent of the visceral divergences in moral in-
tuitions that issues like abortion raise.
Mr. Obama asked the graduates to “persuade through
reason, through an appeal whenever we can to universal ra-
ther than parochial principles”. His plea is in many ways a
re-statement of the Rawlsian idea of “public reason [28]”. in
which citizens identify moral and political norms that can
be affirmed by all people, irrespective of personal philo-
sophical or theological beliefs or affiliations. Similarly, the
President would later define this ‘universal principle’ as the
“Golden Rule” –a classic principle of two-foundation (indi-
vidualizing) morality, namely fairness/cheating. The paro-
chial (binding) principles, rooted deeply in the other moral
foundations, the President seemed to imply, were off limits
(or at least inferior) in the abortion debate. In these
remarks he misjudged the power intuitions may exert in
such disagreements. By framing the terms of dialogue on
contested procedural premises, Mr. Obama created un-
necessary preconditions for negotiation. For “parochial
principles” function as key relevant considerations that
many social conservatives cannot suddenly abandon. If so-
cial intuitionism is correct, when 5-foundation social con-
servatives think through a complex issue such as abortion,
they cannot separate care/harm and fairness/cheating from
questions pertaining to human sanctity.
Some consensus may be found by appealing to the two-
shared moral foundations (what the President attempted to
do at Notre Dame). In many ways the data from this study,
and the framing of the President’s remarks, suggest that op-
ponents in the abortion debate remain “moral strangers
[29]”. To achieve President Obama’s formulation of “fair-
minded [1]” discussion, opponents must avoid setting up
the dialogue to exclude key virtues and principles for moral
judgments relevant to their opponent’s moral communities.
Such maneuvering replaces constructive argumentation in
the face of pluralism with unconstructive and entrenched
polarization in the guise of mere neutral deliberative
procedure.In summary, contemporary bioethics discourse often
reaches a stopping point in rational debate beyond
which two people, if holding conflicting underlying intu-
itions about the moral life, cannot seem to reach any
further common ground. As investigators continue to
gain more insights into the interplay between reason
and emotion in moral decision-making, we believe that
insights from social intuitionism may provide a powerful
tool for understanding the nature of moral controversy.
Acknowledging differences in moral intuitions may em-
power constructive dialogue particularly on contentious
issues in bioethics. Although it does not solve the prob-
lems of pluralism, current work in moral psychology has
the potential to describe the nature of our moral dis-
agreements and support a process of dialogue and argu-
mentation that begins with fair description of what
issues are really at stake in the debate.
Endnote
aHaidt has recently proposed a sixth foundation, [lib-
erty/oppression] which makes people respond to at-
tempts of domination (10).
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